Christensen & Jensen, P.C., fka Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.; L. Rich Humpherys v. Barrett & Daines; W. Scott Barrett, fka Barret & Brady; Robert Slusher : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Christensen & Jensen, P.C., fka Christensen, Jensen
& Powell, P.C.; L. Rich Humpherys v. Barrett &
Daines; W. Scott Barrett, fka Barret & Brady;
Robert Slusher : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Karra J. Porter; Roger Christensen; Christensen & Jensen; David G. Williams; Rodney R. Parker;
Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants/Appellees.
E. Barney Gesas; Charles R. Brown; Walter A. Romney, Jr.; Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson; N.
George Daines; Barrett & Daines; Attorneys for Defendants/ Counterclaim Plaintiffs/Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Christensen & Jensen v. Barrett & Daines, No. 20061044 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6964
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C, fka 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, 
P.C.; L. RICH HUMPHERYS, 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants/ 
Appellees, 
BARRETT & DAINES; W. SCOTT 
BARRETT, fka BARRETT & BRADY; 
ROBERT SLUSHER, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants. 
Case No. 20061044-SC 
Trial Court No. 030916399 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
From the Final Judgments of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Presiding 
Karra J. Porter (Bar No. 5223) 
Roger Christensen (Bar No. 0648) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants/Appellees 
David G. Williams (Bar No. 3481) 
Rodney R. Parker (Bar No. 4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants/Appellees 
E. Barney Gesas (Bar No. 1179) 
Charles R. Brown (Bar No. 0449) 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. (Bar No. 7975) 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C. 
201 South Main Street, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
N. George Daines (Bar No. 0803) 
BARRETT & DAINES 
108 N. Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-4000 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 30 2007 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C., fka 
CHPJSTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, 
P.C.; L. RICH HUMPHERYS, 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants/ 
Appellees, 
v. 
BARRETT & DAINES; W. SCOTT 
BARRETT, fka BARRETT & BRADY; 
ROBERT SLUSHER, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants. 
Case No. 20061044-SC 
Trial Court No. 030916399 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
From the Final Judgments of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Presiding 
Karra J. Porter (Bar No. 5223) 
Roger Christensen (Bar No. 0648) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants/Appellees 
David G. Williams (Bar No. 3481) 
Rodney R. Parker (Bar No. 4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendan ts/Appellees 
E. Barney Gesas (Bar No. 1179) 
Charles R. Brown (Bar No. 0449) 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. (Bar No. 7975) 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C. 
201 South Main Street, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
N. George Daines (Bar No. 0803) 
BARRETT & DAINES 
108 N. Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-4000 
Attorneys forDefendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
MALPRACTICE COUNTERCLAIMS 1 
I. SLUSHER'S RIGHTS WERE NOT LEGALLY IMMATERIAL AND C&J 
SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HIDE ITS MALPRACTICE UNDER 
TECHNICALITIES 1 
II. LOST SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY DAMAGES 4 
A. Slusher Preserved His Right to Lost-Settlement-Opportunity Damages 4 
B. Slusher's Lost-Settlement-Opportunity Is Not Speculative 6 
III. VACATUR IS NOT RELEVANT TO CAUSATION. NEVERTHELESS, THIS 
COURT LIKELY WOULD HAVE VACATED ITS 2001 STATE FARM 
OPINION UPON JOINT MOTION OF THE PARTIES 8 
A. Vacatur is Not Relevant to Causation 9 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Bonner Mall Decision is Distinguishable 10 
1. Bonner Mall is a federal procedural decision not binding on 
this Court 10 
2. Utah courts have a history of vacating published opinions 
based on stipulation of the parties 10 
3. Bonner Mall is factually distinguishable 12 
4. Exceptional circumstances existed to vacate the decision 13 
C. Mrs. Campbell's and the Ospitals Refusal to Accept State Farm's 
Settlement Offer Does Not Defeat Slusher's Malpractice Claims 15 
IV. SLUSHER'S MALPRACTICE CLAIMS SEEKING LOST-SETTLMENT-
OPPORTUNTY DAMAGES ARE NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 17 
ATTORNEY FEE DISPUTE 20 
I. BARRETT'S APPEAL SEEKS REDRESS FOR ERRORS OF LAW 20 
II. BARRETT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 25 
CONCLUSION 25 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Adamson v. Adamson, 2004 UT 41,1(4, 94 P.3d 260 13 
Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt., 2006 UT App 331,1J14, 153 P.3d 
714 20 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, |14, 48 P.3d 968 4, 5 
DHXv. Allianz AGFMat, Ltd., 425 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) 16 
Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, 69 P.3d 965 (Cal. 2003). 17, 18 
Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir.1993) 16 
Great American E & S Insurance Company v. Knuteson, Supreme Court Case No. 
20060368-SC 11 
Major League Baseball Properties v. Pacific Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d at 149 
(2d Cir. 1998) 14 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Goodman, 2006 UT App 276,1f6, 140 P.3d 589 5 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) 12 
Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) 11, 13 
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. Finlayson, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam) 10 
Panterra Corp. v. American Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 300-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1995) 10 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,1|24, 112 P.3d 495 21 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co. Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1043 (Utah 1985) 22 
Slusherv. Ospital, 777 P.2d437,441 (Utah 1989) 15 
Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 856N.E.2d389 (111. 2006) 18 
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) 8, 12, 13 
Statutes 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) 5 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8 5 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.2 1 
u 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.8(g) 2 
Other 
87A.L.R.3d 168 19 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 cmt. b (2002) 19 
in 
ARGUMENT 
MALPRACTICE COUNTERCLAIMS 
I. SLUSHER'S RIGHTS WERE NOT LEGALLY IMMATERIAL AND C&J 
CANNOT HIDE ITS MALPRACTICE UNDER TECHNICALITIES. 
In footnote 1 of their brief on appeal, Appellees Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
("C&J") and L. Rich Humpherys ("LRH") (collectively, "C&J," unless otherwise 
indicated), reveal their fundamental misunderstanding of their obligations, as attorneys, 
to their client, Appellant Robert Slusher ("Slusher"): 
On appeal, Slusher claims that a conflict of interest existed among the 
clients that precluded Humphreys (and Barrett, too, presumably) from 
representing all three sets of clients, because Slusher's primary interest was 
money, whereas the Campbells and Ospitals were more concerned about 
principal. . . . Slusher expressly agreed to the arrangement in which 
unanimous consent was required for acceptance of a settlement offer. 
There is no inherent conflict in such an arrangement, but regardless, any 
such conflict was waived. Moreover, as discussed infra, Slusher's 
contention would not affect the outcome in any event, as the named 
plaintiffs consent was required to settle the case, and Mrs. Campbell would 
never have consented to the settlement offer discussed below, regardless of 
who represented her. Thus, any alleged "conflict" was legally immaterial. 
(C&J's Brief, p. 6 n. 1.) (emphasis added). Although C&J has produced no evidence of a 
conflict waiver executed at the time the conflict arose, there is a more fundamental 
problem with its argument. Namely, a client does not forever forsake his individual 
rights upon entering into a litigation group or an agreement to aggregately settle a case. 
Slusher, for instance, as a client of C&J's, retained the individual right, separate 
from the other clients, to demand reasonable competence and undivided loyalty from his 
counsel and to have ultimate say over the settling of his interest in the litigation. See 
Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.2 (requiring a lawyer to "abide by a client's decision whether to 
1 
settle a matter"); Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.8(g) (prohibiting aggregate settlements 
without each client's informed consent at the time of the settlement offer); ABA Formal 
Op. 06-438 (2006) (observing that "Rule 1.8(g) deters lawyers from favoring one client 
over another in settlement negotiations . . . [and] empowers each client to withhold 
consent and thus prevent the lawyer from subordinating the interests of the client to those 
of another client or to those of the lawyer."). 
This authority is directly contrary to C&J's apparent position in this case that once 
a client becomes part of a litigation group, his individual rights are "legally immaterial" 
and malpractice can only be committed against the entire client group. At one time, 
however, C&J apparently recognized Slusher's rights to individually settle his interest, as 
evidenced by its January 30, 2001 letter to the clients informing them if any one client 
wanted to settle his or her 1/3 interest, possible options included that client individually 
settling directly with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance ("State Farm") or through 
a litigation financing company. (R. 1466; attached as Addendum H to Slusher's initial 
brief). Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, C&J failed to even explore these options 
in the context of an actual offer, instead treating Slusher as "legally immaterial" as 
compared to the other clients.l This treatment constitutes malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty and was the direct cause of Slusher's lost settlement opportunity. 
Instead of accepting responsibility for its malpractice and breach of the duty of 
loyalty to Slusher, C&J persists in trying to hide behind technicalities, the guise of 
1
 Barrett, who C&J had largely excluded from the case, was not even informed of 
State Farm's offer until after its rejection and was not informed of Slusher's displeasure 
with the lack of settlement until much later, in January 2002. (R. 550-51; 561; 666.) 
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speculative causation, and even instances of its own malpractice. For example, even 
though causation is generally a question of fact, C&J has argued that Slusher cannot 
establish causation as a matter of law because Slusher agreed in 1995—prior to the jury 
trial in the underlying bad faith action against State Farm—that all settlements must be 
unanimous. Slusher, C&J claims, had no right to change his mind despite the passage of 
almost a decade. This argument not only ignores C&J's own acknowledgment in its 
January 30, 2001 letter, but fails to recognize that C&J's binding of Slusher to such an 
agreement is, itself, an instance of malpractice. A lawyer has an ongoing duty throughout 
the entire relationship to avoid conflicts. 
As the ultimate arbiter of lawyers' behavior in the State of Utah, this Court must 
reject C&J's attempts to hide its malpractice and breaches of fiduciary duty. Simply put, 
as a matter of public policy, an attorney should not be able treat a client as "legally 
immaterial" and then avoid the scrutiny of a jury by using his own malpractice and legal 
gymnastics to obscure facts and prevent the occurrence of events that would help prove 
the malpractice. Moreover, due to the extra power a lawyer exercises over an individual 
client who is part of a litigation group, there must be heightened scrutiny given to C&J's 
conduct here. This Court should let the jury decide whether or not C&J's behavior 
towards Slusher was improper and, if so, whether this behavior caused him damage. 
For example, C&J made no effort to even try to settle after rejecting State Farm's 
offer on November 16, 2001, although it knew Slusher wanted to settle. Instead, on 
December 7, 2001 C&J hastily memorialized the informal 1995 unanimous consent 
agreement. C&J now tries to use its own lack of effort and this agreement to argue that 
causation is speculative because Slusher cannot show that any further settlement 
"overtures" were made (C&J's brief, p. 33) and because the agreement prevented 
individualized settlement. Public policy forbids C&J from benefiting from such conduct. 
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II. LOST SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY DAMAGES. 
A. Slusher Preserved His Right to Lost-Settlement-Opportunity Damages. 
To limit the scope of its malpractice, C&J argues that Slusher may not seek 
damages for a lost settlement opportunity outside of State Farm's November 14, 2001 
Settlement Offer because his malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims in the 
Amended Counterclaim are limited to "damages resulting from rejection of the 
$150,000,000 offer." (C&J's Brief, p. 31; see also id. p. 24.) C&J posits this theory in 
hopes of reducing its liability to Slusher and, of course, to attempt to bury, under yet 
another technicality, its own acknowledgment in the January 30, 2001 letter to the clients 
that individualized settlement with State Farm was possible. (R. 1466.) Contrary to 
C&J's arguments, Slusher's claims for lost-settlement-opportunity damages were raised 
before the trial court and preserved in the record. 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, \ 14, 48 P.3d 968. To "help 
determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: (1) the issue must be raised in 
a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
C&J misreads this rule as requiring all theories to be specifically pleaded in a 
party's complaint or counterclaim. However, Utah has a "liberal standard of notice 
pleading," requiring Slusher only to "give [C&J] fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." MBNA 
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America Bank N.A. v. Goodman, 2006 UT App 276,^6, 140 P.3d 589; see also Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8. Moreover, contrary to C&J's contention, parties are permitted to preserve an 
issue by raising it before the trial court after the pleadings are closed. See Brookside, 
2002 UT 48 at f 15 (ruling issue sufficiently raised that was brought during summary 
judgment phase of proceedings); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
S lusher provided the trial court with ample opportunity to rule on his lost-
settlement-opportunity damages by raising the issue in his Amended Counterclaim, on 
Summary Judgment, and through a post-judgment motion under Rule 59(e), wherein the 
January 30, 2001 letter was introduced without objection from C&J. For example: 
Amended Complaint: 
• In Paragraphs 16-18 of the Amended Counterclaim, Slusher alleges C&J 
committed its malpractice with respect to settlement with State Farm both on and 
after November 16, 2001. (R. 318.) 
• Paragraph 18: "On or after November 16, 2001, Slusher was fully prepared and 
willing to travel to Salt Lake City, Utah to meet in person with C&JH, LRH, Ms. 
Campbell, the Ospitals and Barrett in Salt Lake City, Utah to analyze and discuss 
the State Farm settlement offers." (R. 318.) 
• In the Prayer for Relief, Slusher prays, "For any and other further relief deemed 
appropriate." (R. 331.) 
Summary Judgment Opposition: 
• Page 9 of the Memorandum: "Whether a conflict of interest existed because of 
C&J and LHR's failure to fully inform and advise the clients, including Slusher, 
so that they could make an informed decision on whether to accept the settlement 
offer thereby causing damage to Barrett and Slusher." (R. 515.) 
• Page 9: "Whether the failure of C&J and LHR to try to obtain more time or 
further negotiate the offer would have enabled the offer to be accepted thereby 
causing damage to Barrett and Slusher." (R. 515.) 
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Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) Motion: 
• Fact No. 20: "LRH and C&J failed to inform Slusher he could seek separate 
counsel and attempt to negotiate separately with State Farm." (R. 1482.) 
• Fact No. 28: "It is clear by the January 30 and 31, 2001 letters of LRH and Barrett 
that LRH and C&J were sensitive to and fully aware that one of the alternative 
remedies for any of the clients was to seek a settlement with State Farm on their 
own as to their share of the award. Such settlement opportunities were their 
lawful rights under all of the representation agreements that are the subject matter 
of this litigation. (R. 1484.) 
• Page 13 of the Memorandum: "C&J and LRH were well aware of Barrett's right 
to seek independent representation and negotiate an independent settlement, as 
indicated by paragraphs 5 and 6 of their January 30, 2001 letter addressed to the 
clients and Barrett's January 31, 2001 letter addressed to LRH." (R.1489.) 
Indeed, the trial court ruled upon the possibility of separate settlement between 
Slusher and State Farm—albeit by improperly weighing the credibility of the evidence— 
in its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter and Amend: "To then 
suggest that State Farm might have attempted to cut its potential losses by settling 
separately with Slusher is even more speculative than the proposition that a global 
settlement could have been achieved." (R. 2094.) Accordingly, it is clear that Slusher 
adequately preserved the issue of his right to lost-settlement-opportunity damages. 
C&J's further attempt to take advantage of a technicality must be rejected. 
B. Slusher's Lost-Settlement-Opportunity Is Not Speculative. 
C&J also argues that even if the issue was preserved, and notwithstanding C&J's 
own acknowledgment of the possibility of individualized settlement for one client in the 
January 30, 2001 letter, the causation for Slusher's lost-settlement-opportunity damages 
is unduly speculative because Slusher failed to show that "State Farm or a finance 
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company would in fact have made an unconditional offer for his interest alone . . . or that 
Slusher and his personal attorney could not have obtained the very same result by 
making inquiries themselves between the October 19, 2001, opinion and the U.S. 
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari on June 30, 2002." (C&J's Brief, p. 24, 33.) 
C&J's astonishing position that Slusher should have pursued settlement with State Farm 
on his own behalf, without being advised to seek independent counsel and after he had 
hired C&J to represent him in this matter and for this purpose, shocks the conscious and 
is a compelling admission of just how little consideration and effort C&J put forth to 
pursue Slusher's interests in the litigation. 
As indicated above and in Slusher's initial brief on appeal (pages 32-33, 36-39), 
C&J breached its duty of loyalty and care to Slusher by, among other actions, subverting 
Slusher's desires for settlement to those of the other clients, who clearly had conflicting 
interests; by insisting that Slusher was forever and inextricably bound by a 1995 
agreement requiring unanimous consent to settle; and by failing to make any effort to 
settle the case on Slusher's behalf. As the following facts show, C&J's breaches caused 
Slusher to lose a reasonably likely opportunity to settle: 
• State Farm indicated a desire and intent to settle through both its November 14, 
2001 Settlement Offer letter and earlier settlement offers to C&J. (R.343; 346.) 
• The deposition testimony of Michael Zimmerman, State Farm's counsel, indicates 
that State Farm would have continued to negotiate for settlement with the group 
and that it would have considered settling with the clients individually if they 
broke off from each other. (R. 539-42; 678.) 
• State Farm's Settlement Letter, itself, invited further negotiation by stating that it 
would like to settle before the Utah Supreme Court rules on State Farm's "soon to 
be filed" petition for rehearing. Although State Farm requested a response by 
November 16, 2001, it did not set that as the cut-off date for negotiations (R.343.) 
7 
• C&J's recognized the possibility of individualized settlement as early as 
January 30, 2001—long before the Settlement Offer Letter was sent and 
rejected—as demonstrated by LRH's January 30, 2001 letter to the Clients setting 
forth alternatives "[i]f less than all of you want to settle." (R. 1464-67.) 
• The Declaration of Victor L. Lund stating that the any responsible officers and 
directors of a large public company, such as State Farm, would seriously consider 
and negotiate for any settlement that reduced its contingent liability by $50 million 
or more. (R. 1470-75; attached as Addendum A to this Reply Brief.) 
These facts demonstrate a sufficient causal connection between C&J's breach and 
Slusher's harm to survive summary judgment. How much this lost settlement 
opportunity is worth is for the jury to decide, not the trial court on summary judgment by 
itself speculating what would or would not be of advantage to State Farm. 
III. VACATUR IS NOT RELEVANT TO CAUSATION. NEVERTHELESS, 
THIS COURT LIKELY WOULD HAVE VACATED ITS 2001 STATE 
FARM OPINION UPON JOINT MOTION OF THE PARTIES. 
C&J's chief argument on appeal is that the vacatur condition of State Farm's 
November 16, 2001 Settlement Offer could not have been met, as a matter of law, 
making causation legally speculative and deficient. Specifically, C&J argues that this 
Court would have refused to vacate its 2001 State Farm opinion under the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 18 
(1994). C&J's argument is misdirected, however, because the vacatur question is not 
relevant to causation and, even if it were relevant, this Court likely would have vacated 
its 2001 State Farm opinion upon joint motion to settle an over decade-old case. 
Note that C&J does not dispute that this Court has the power to vacate an opinion 
under Utah R. App. P. 37—which was the rule Mr. Zimmerman indicated the parties 
would seek vacatur under in the November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer letter. 
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A. Vacatur is Not Relevant to Causation. 
As Slusher indicated on pages 41-44 of his initial brief, the vacatur condition is 
not relevant to causation for at least three reasons: (1) Slusher could have individually 
settled his 1/3 interest in the judgment with State Farm or sold his interest to a litigation 
financing company—which possibilities C&J acknowledged in its January 30, 2001 
letter—prior to this Court's consideration of the vacatur question, making the vacatur 
condition irrelevant to a separate individual resolution by Slusher; (2) C&J's refusal to 
negotiate further with State Farm or explore the contours of State Farm's desire for 
vacatur are, themselves, instances of malpractice that deprived Slusher and the rest of the 
client group of a meaningful and informed decision as to whether to settle the case; and 
(3) because the terms of State Farm's November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer required the 
parties to file a joint motion to vacate the 2001 State Farm opinion, State Farm's 
November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer would have already been accepted by the time this 
Court actually considered the vacatur question upon the parties' joint motion. Thus, a 
refusal by this Court to vacate might be relevant to damages, but not to causation. 
Each of these three reasons reveal the shortcomings and inherent flaws in C&J's 
and the trial court's reliance on the vacatur condition to defeat causation. Notably, 
despite the fact that Slusher identified each of these flaws in his initial brief, C&J has not 
even not addressed them, choosing instead to try to hide behind the U.S. Supreme Court's 
entirely-distinguishable Bonner Mall decision. Slusher is confident that this Court will 
acknowledge these flaws as fatal to C&J's "speculative" causation argument, or at least 
as sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury, without the need to determine whether 
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or not (a) this Court would have vacated the 2001 State Farm opinion on joint motion of 
the parties, or (b) the applicability of Bonner Mall to Utah. 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Bonner Mall Decision is Distinguishable. 
Even if this Court determines that it does need to consider the vacatur issue, 
which, as noted, it does not, the facts of this case combined with Utah law, public policy 
and Utah precedent indicate that it would have vacated its 2001 State Farm decision upon 
joint motion of the parties. As shown below, C&J's reliance on U.S. Bancorp Mortgage 
Co. v. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) was misplaced for at least four (4) reasons.4 
1. Bonner Mall is a federal procedural decision not binding on this Court. 
Bonner Mall is a federal decision, based upon federal procedural law, that is not 
binding upon this Court. This Court's power to vacate does not stem from federal 
authority but from Utah R. App. P. 37. At least one other state, Texas, has refused to 
follow the Bonner Mall decision on independent state grounds. See Panterra Corp. v. 
American Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 300-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
2. Utah courts have a history of vacating published opinions based on 
stipulation of the parties. 
There is precedence of Utah courts vacating published opinions based on 
settlement and/or stipulation of the parties. In Metropolitan Property & Liability 
Insurance Co. v. Finlayson, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam), the Utah 
Court of Appeals vacated its initial published opinion under the following Order: 
This appeal was initially decided by opinion dated March 7, 1988. See 
In setting forth these reasons, Slusher has assumed, as this Court must assume, that 
the vacatur issue came before this Court on joint motion of all of the parties. 
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Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). Respondent subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, 
which was granted. The court heard reargument and took the matter under 
advisement. Prior to any further disposition by the court, the parties 
entered into a settlement. With the appeal thus resolved, there is no "case or 
controversy" which this court may properly now decide. However, the 
court considers it inappropriate that its initial opinion stand since rehearing 
had been granted and the court had determined that reconsideration of its 
opinion was in order. 
As can clearly be seen, there are striking similarities between the situation faced 
by the Finlayson Court and the situation that would have been before this Court in the 
instant case. While it is difficult to predict precisely what this Court would have done if 
presented with a joint motion to vacate by State Farm and the clients, it is reasonable (and 
certainly not unduly speculative as a matter of law) to assume that this Court would have 
followed the Utah Court of Appeals lead on like facts rather than the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision on distinct facts, and vacated its 2001 State Farm opinion. 
Moreover, more recently, this Court vacated an opinion, Great American E & S 
Insurance Company v. Knuteson, Supreme Court Case No. 20060368-SC, on stipulation 
of the parties the day it was issued. The undersigned counsel was on the Court' s email 
notification list, and received notification of the issuance of the opinion on July 17, 2007 
at approximately 10:00 a.m. and the subsequent email on July 17, 2007 at approximately 
12:46 p.m. (Copies of these emails are included in Addendum B to this Reply Brief.) 
The trial court docketing statement entry for Knuteson for July 18, 2007 further indicates: 
Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Order of Dismissal - based upon the 
stipulation of the parties - it is hereby ordered that this appeal is dismissed, 
each party to bear their own costs and fees - 20060368-SC 
(This docketing sheet is attached as Addendum C to this Reply Brief.) Thus, based on 
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this precedence, this Court likely would have vacated its 2001 State Farm opinion to 
finalize a favorable $150,000,000 settlement of a more than a decade-old litigation.5 
3. Bonner Mall is factually distinguishable. 
Bonner Mall is factually distinct from the case at hand. In Bonner Mall Bancorp 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, after receiving an 
unfavorable decision from the Ninth Circuit. 513 U.S. at 20. The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted the petition. Id. After briefing on the merits, however, the parties settled their 
dispute, mooting the case. Id. Bancorp further requested that the U.S. Supreme Court 
vacate the Ninth Circuit's decision, a motion that Bonner Mall opposed. Id. On these 
facts and procedural posture, the U.S. Supreme Court examined "vacatur once more in 
the light shed by adversary presentation," and refused to vacate the Ninth Circuit's 
opinion on public policy grounds. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
The instant case is dramatically different. Unlike Bonner Mall, this Court would 
have been asked to vacate its own opinion on the joint motion of all the parties, prior to or 
just after State Farm's filing of a petition for rehearing to this Court and prior to State 
Farm's filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 
There would have therefore been no party opposing the vacatur motion, which was a 
critical distinction from the situation faced in Bonner Mall. See id. at 26 (observing, as a 
5
 Slusher requests and moves this Court to take judicial notice of its procedural 
history in considering the issues on appeal. See Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(observing Utah R. Evid. 201 gives 
an appellate court discretion to take judicial notice of facts for the first time on appeal in 
appropriate circumstances). This is an appropriate circumstance as the filing and 
subsequent vacation of Knuteson opinion did not occur until after Slusher had submitted 
his initial brief on appeal. 
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reason to deny vacatur, "it is petitioner's burden, as the party seeking relief from the 
status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not merely equivalent 
responsibility for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of 
vacatur." (emphasis added)). For this Court to have denied a request for vacatur without 
an opposing party would be tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion. See Adamson 
v. Adamson, 2004 UT 41,^4, 94 P.3d 260 (dismissing a petition for certiorari after it was 
granted and oral argument was heard because the petitioner's actions rendered the issue 
moot and "judicial policy dictates against our rendering an advisory opinion when an 
issue is moot" (quotations and citation omitted)); accord Finlayson, 766 P.2d at 437.6 
4. Exceptional circumstances existed to vacate the decision. 
Even if this Court were to follow Bonner Mall, it still could have and likely would 
have vacated the 2001 State Farm decision for exceptional circumstances based on the 
distinct facts. Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Bonner Mall declined to permit 
vacatur under the facts presented, it expressly cautioned: 
This is not to say that vacatur can never be granted when mootness is 
produced in that fashion [via settlement]. As we have described, the 
determination is an equitable one, and exceptional circumstances may 
conceivably counsel in favor of such a course. 
In addition, in Bonner Mall the request to vacate the Ninth Circuit decision came to 
the country's highest court, after settlement, but before the U.S. Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to review the merits—a fact the U.S. Supreme Court found compelling in 
denying vacatur. See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27 ("It seems to us inappropriate, 
however, to vacate mooted cases, in which we have no constitutional power to decide on 
the merits, on the basis of assumptions about the merits.") In the present case, the Utah 
Supreme Court had already rendered opinion on the merits of the State Farm case and 
made the opinion available to the public. Regardless of vacatur, the opinion would not 
vanish from public consciousness; it would merely lose its precedential value {see 
footnote 7, below). 
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513 U.S. at 29. 
The Second Circuit had a chance to apply this language in Major League Baseball 
Properties v. Pacific Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d at 149 (2d Cir. 1998), wherein it 
vacated a federal district court's opinion, upon joint motion of both parties, in order to 
permit the parties to settle their dispute. Id. at 150-51. In so holding, the Second Circuit 
found exceptional circumstances existed for vacatur based upon the fact both appellant 
("MLB") and appellee ("Pacific") equally desired to settle the case and vacate the lower 
court's decision in favor of Pacific denying MLB's motion for a preliminary injunction 
for trademark infringement: 
The parties were locked in a dispute that they could end on a commercial 
basis satisfactory to both. However, a vacatur of the district court's order 
was a necessary condition of settlement. Unlike Bancorp, therefore, the 
victor in the district court wanted a settlement as much as, or more than, the 
loser did. 
Id. 
The present case is similar. Here, although the Utah Supreme Court had already 
rendered its 2001 State Farm Opinion, State Farm indicated in its November 14, 2001 
Settlement Offer that it intended to file a petition for rehearing to the Utah Supreme 
Court and a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. (R. 243.) This 
intention would undoubtedly have been repeated in the parties' joint motion to vacate, 
apprising this Court of the possibility that its 2001 State Farm opinion may be reversed if 
not settled (which is, of course, what happened). Similar to Major League, therefore, all 
parties had some incentive to settle (particularly if C&J had informed the clients of the 
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effects of a reversal), which would have been reflected in the filing of a joint motion. 
Unlike Bonner Mall, this Court would have had a chance to avoid a potential 
future reversal, uphold and apply the substance of the jury's $145 million punitive 
damage award to make State Farm accountable for its bad faith conduct, and finally 
resolve the long-standing litigation between the parties on terms favorable to the client 
group, thereby advancing Utah's public policy. See Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 
(Utah 1989) ("The public policy is to encourage settlements."). Balancing all of this 
against only an undefined public's interest in the precedential effect of the decision 
(particularly a decision that had both the potential to be and unfortunate result of being 
short lived), the equities clearly favored vacatur, establishing exceptional circumstances 
necessary to vacate the decision. 
C. Mrs, Campbell's and the Ospitals Refusal to Accept State Farm's 
Settlement Offer Does Not Defeat Slusher's Malpractice Claims. 
C&J also argues that even if this Court would have vacated its 2001 State Farm 
opinion, Slusher cannot establish causation as a matter of law because Mrs. Campbell and 
the Ospitals would not agree to vacate. This argument fails for at least two reasons. 
First, as indicated in both Section I and subsection A of this section, Slusher's 
malpractice claims are not tied to the other clients. C&J owes a separate duty to Slusher 
apart from the other clients. C&J has breached this duty by refusing to abide by or make 
any effort to abide by Slusher's desires regarding settlement. This breach caused damage 
to Slusher in the form of a lost settlement opportunity, which includes individual 
settlement direct with State Farm or through a litigation financing company, regardless of 
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this Court's decision on vacatur. 
Second, as indicated on pages 33-34 and 42-43 of Slusher's initial brief, C&J's 
breach of its standard of care by, among other actions, hastily rejecting State Farm's 
Settlement Offer, failing to adequately explore and discuss the vacatur condition with 
State Farm or the clients, and failing to discuss the possible effects of a reversal of the 
State Farm decision, clearly deprived Slusher and the rest of the clients of necessary 
information and alternatives needed to properly evaluate the offer and make an informed 
decision to accept or reject it and/or to discuss future offers. If differently advised, the 
clients may have chosen differently. While it is difficult to predict what would have 
happened but for C&J's breaches of the standard of care, C&J should not be rewarded for 
this difficulty with a decision as a matter of law. Whether and to what extent these 
breaches caused damage to Slusher and the rest of clients requires a weighing of evidence 
that is properly the task of the jury, not the trial court on summary judgment. 
While Mr. Zimmerman's deposition testimony is to the contrary—that State Farm 
was not seeking a "gag order" (R. 539-40) from the clients—C&J claims that it correctly 
advised the clients with respect to the meaning of vacatur as an opinion that had "just not 
happened." (R. 665.) In support of this assertion, C&J cites dictionary definitions and 
self-serving law review articles denigrating the use of vacatur as a tool that "has the 
potential to destroy even the informational value of a case by causing it to disappear 
without a trace." (C&J's Brief, p. 34 n.8.) Importantly, not all authority agrees with this 
position. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, recently observed "at a minimum, a vacated 
opinion still carries informational and perhaps even persuasive precedential value." DHX 
v. Allianz AGFMat, Ltd., 425 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing cases); accord 
Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that a vacated district court 
opinion carries informational value "even if the reviewing court intoned in its most 
solemn voice that the district court's decision would have no precedential effect"). Had 
C&J taken the opportunity to discuss this vacatur condition with State Farm, it may have 
been informed of these alternative impressions of vacatur and so advised the client group. 
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IV. SLUSHER'S MALPRACTICE CLAIMS SEEKING LOST-SETTLEMENT-
OPPORTUNTY DAMAGES ARE NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
C&J devotes a significant portion of their brief to arguing that Slusher's recovery 
of lost settlement damages, including C&J's negligent and improper rejection of State 
Farm's Settlement Offer, is contrary to public policy. C&J cites case law and treatises 
from other jurisdictions that prohibit, on public policy grounds, a legal malpractice 
plaintiffs recovery of "lost" punitive damages from their attorney in a legal malpractice 
claim. This was a fruitless exercise because, regardless of the merits of these authorities, 
they are legally and factually distinct from the case at hand.8 
The authority C&J relies upon applies to the situation where an attorney's 
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty while litigating a case causes a client to lose out 
on punitive damages, i.e., but for the defendant attorney's malpractice in some aspect of 
the litigation, the plaintiff client would have prevailed at trial and recovered punitive 
damages. In Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, 69 P.3d 965 (Cal. 
2003), for example, class counsel stipulated to certification of a mandatory, non-opt-out 
class with respect to punitive damages. To settle the suit, class counsel agreed to dismiss 
punitive-damages class claims with prejudice. Over objections from some class members, 
the trial court dismissed punitive damages claims and approved settlement. Two objectors 
sued the law firm and its attorneys for the punitive damages they would have recovered 
but for counsel's negligence, alleging legal malpractice. Based on these facts, the 
Note that C&J designates this issue as Issue #3 on appeal. However, neither 
Slusher nor Barrett appealed this issue. Although C&J raised this argument before the 
trial court, it was not ruled upon below, and C&J has not cross-appealed any issue in this 
case. Accordingly, C&J is not entitled to raise this, or any other issues, on appeal. 
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California Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the malpractice claims on grounds 
that the lost punitive damages sought were contrary to public policy. Id. at 970-73. 
Likewise, in Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 856 N.E.2d 389 (111. 
2006), the plaintiff client Tri-G brought a legal malpractice action against its former 
counsel "to recover damages it sustained as a result of the defendant law firm's failure to 
prosecute a complaint" in the underlying action. Id. at 394. Following a jury trial on the 
merits of the legal malpractice claim, under the "trial within a trial" method of proving 
legal malpractice, a jury found that the defendant law firm had been negligent in handling 
and failing to prosecute Tri-G's underlying case "and that but for that negligence, Tri-G 
would have recovered $1,168,775 in compensatory damages and an equal sum in punitive 
damages from the [underlying defendant]." Id. Once again, based on these facts, the 
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the punitive damage portion of the jury's malpractice 
award, concluding that it was against Illinois public policy to award a "lost" punitive 
damages to a malpractice plaintiff, as this shifts the punitive liability to the law firm. Id. 
As can clearly be seen, in both Ferguson and Tri-G, the malpractice claimants truly 
sought "lost" punitive damages. 
The present case is clearly distinguishable. Unlike C&J's authorities, Slusher has 
not brought suit to recover a "lost" punitive damage award from C&J, but rather to 
recover damages from a lost settlement opportunity with State Farm. Slusher is not 
claiming that but for C&J's malpractice he would have received his share of the full 
amount of the over $200,000,000 (with interest) punitive damage award against State 
Farm. Slusher has not, for instance, argued that if C&J would have submitted a better 
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brief before the United States Supreme Court, the punitive damage award would never 
have been overturned. If such were the facts, the above authorities may be applicable. 
To the contrary, Slusher seeks malpractice damages stemming from C&J's 
improper rejection of State Farm's November 14, 2001 $150,000,000 Settlement Offer 
and C&J's refusal to pursue other settlement opportunities on Slusher's behalf. There is 
no question that such lost-settlement-opportunity damages are recoverable in legal 
malpractice, see, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 cmt. b 
(2002) and 87 A.L.R.3d 168 (collecting cases), and are substantively different from 
claims seeking lost punitive damages. Specifically, the speculation inherent in lost-
punitive-damage awards and the public policy concerns of shifting liability for the 
wrongful conduct from the wrongdoer to the attorney are absent from lost-settlement-
opportunity damages, which seek only to hold the attorney accountable for his or her own 
misconduct in regards to the settlement offer actually or reasonably likely to be made. 
Moreover, although State Farm may have used the underlying punitive damage 
award as a starting point in determining the amount of its settlement offer, that punitive 
damage award is legally independent from the settlement offer. If Slusher had 
independently settled with State Farm or sold his interest in the litigation to a litigation 
financing company prior to the petition for rehearing and/or petition for writ of certiorari 
being filed, which possibilities were acknowledged by C&J in their January 30, 2001 
letter to the clients, Slusher would have received the benefit of State Farm's settlement 
offer regardless of whether the punitive damage award were affirmed or reversed. 
Accordingly, Slusher is not seeking to recover lost punitive damages from C&J or 
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attempting to shift liability for State Farm's punitive conduct to C&J. Slusher seeks only 
to hold C&J accountable for its improper actions that cost Slusher a settlement 
opportunity with State Farm. There is no public policy prohibition to such accountability. 
ATTORNEY FEE DISPUTE 
I. BARRETT'S APPEAL SEEKS REDRESS FOR ERRORS OF LAW, 
This action was brought by C&J in derogation of the 1990 Modified Contingency 
Fee Agreement to pay Barrett a 1/3 share of attorney's fees. The Agreement, drafted by 
C&J, and signed by both LRH (on behalf of C&J), and Barrett, contained simple 
language regarding the interrelationship of the attorneys: 
This will confirm our agreement and understanding concerning the split of 
the attorney fees relating to this action. Given the present posture of the 
case and our respective involvements, we agreed that an equitable split of 
the attorneys fees would be an apportionment of 2/3 of the fee to 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, and 1/3 to your office. You would continue 
to render some assistance in the case and I would continue to be lead 
counsel. Please sign where indicated on the enclosed copy of this letter to 
confirm this agreement and return the copy to me. 
(R. 335) (emphasis added). This Agreement modified the earlier 1984 Contingency 
Agreement wherein Barrett was to receive one half of the attorney's fees. 
Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. Thus, [the 
reviewing courts] accord the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the 
contract no deference and review them for correctness. 
Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. MgmL, 2006 UT App 331,1[14, 153 P.3d 714. 
It was for the trial court to determine what "render some assistance" meant in the 
context of the Agreement and the previous six-year history between the attorneys. In 
making this determination, the trial court should have acknowledged that the parties 
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themselves, following six-years of litigation, had already modified their original 50-50 
arrangement based upon their actual proportionate efforts to provide for an "equitable 
split of the attorneys fees." (R. 335.) See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,124, 112 P.3d 
495 (observing, in determining the amount of an equitable distribution, that "[e]ven if a 
written agreement is invalid for the purposes of enforcement, it may still be considered as 
evidence of the intent behind the agreement."). The trial court failed to do this. Instead 
the trial court erroneously made resolution of this controversy a fact determination as to 
whether Barrett had done enough to earn his share of the contingency fee, as if the 
representation were a by-the-hour arrangement. 
Following an incorrect legal standard, the trial court (in its equity phase) accepted 
C&J's stacks of paper as evidence that the large law firm had not only outperformed 
Barrett, but that by comparison, Barrett had not performed enough. C&J argued that 
instead of looking to the intentions reflected in the 1990 Agreement, the trial court should 
exercise its equitable powers to rework the bargain. C&J claimed that because it had 
done quantitatively more work than Barrett, the 2/3 and 1/3 bargain struck by the 1990 
Agreement (drafted by C&J), should now be modified further to pay Barrett only what he 
"earned" on an hourly or some like measured basis. However, that was not the basis for 
C&J's compensation; there is no reason it should have served as the basis for Barrett's. 
It is conceded that C&J did more than two-thirds of the legal work. But that was 
the understood relationship between C&J and Barrett before the 1990 modification and 
was the very reason why LRH drafted the 1990 Agreement to "equitably" amend the 
1984 Agreement to reduce Barrett's share to one-third. 
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Given the contractual expression of intent and the parties' history, the trial court's 
focus should have been whether the 1990 Agreement on its face is clear as to its terms 
and accurately represented the intent of the parties for an "equitable split" of the fees. 
Instead the trial court retrospectively reformed the parties' arrangement based on the trial 
court's "idea of what's fair under the circumstances" (R. 2138, p 45, C&J's Brief, p. 46-
7), which turned out to be how much paperwork and hours each of the parties generated, 
and which completely disregarded the parties' stated intention of equitable distribution. 
Regarding the retrospective reformation of a contract to create "fairness," this Court held 
To judge the substantive fairness of contracts at a date subsequent to their 
making could nullify many contracts entailing a speculative element. 
Option to purchase agreements, for instance, might prove particularly 
difficult to enforce. Contingency fee contracts would be suspect if the 
party contracting for the fee achieved unexpectedly beneficial results. 
Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 1985) 
The parties may not have been able to forecast in 1984 that the future litigation 
would entail thousands of hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and take 20 
years to resolve. However, they certainly had a better idea of their task when the 1990 
modification occurred. By then Barrett and C&J well knew that the risk involved with 
undertaking bad faith litigation against State Farm. They also knew that C&J would be 
required to act as lead counsel because of its larger staff of attorney's and C&J's financial 
capability to finance the litigation work. Barrett's role was simply described in the 
modification as to "render some assistance" when requested by C&J. 
In this matter, Barrett reported 1,050 hours spent on litigation and communication 
with clients and co-counsel, despite the fact that he was significantly older than the C&J 
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attorneys.9 (R. 1769, C&J's Brief at 44, % 5). Despite the plain meaning and clear import 
of the contractual language, C&J argued unfairness by comparing Barrett's contributions 
to C&J's work hours and paper product. In addition, C&J demeaned the quality of 
Barrett's work. In hindsight, C&J considered the fee sharing provision of the 1990 
Agreement to be a bad bargain. Although the trial court's exact equitable basis and 
measure is unclear (as indicated in Barrett's and Slusher's initial brief), the trial court 
appeared to follow C&J's suggestion to pay Barrett at an hourly rate, the total of which 
equaled approximately $25,000, or 0.5% of the total legal fees of $4,800,000. Barrett 
received $25,000 (an hourly rate of approximately $25.00 based upon an hourly formula) 
instead of $1,600,000, with the $1,575,000 difference going to C&J as a windfall. 
Importantly, the record is devoid of any statement from C&J to Barrett saying in 
effect: "Your work performance as co-counsel thus far is insufficient, and unless you start 
doing more work, and contributing financially to the costs of this litigation, we will 
declare you in breach of the 1990 Agreement, and you will lose your 1/3 share of the 
attorney's fees from any future award." To the contrary, C&J acknowledges that Barrett 
continued to represent S lusher, and that Slusher valued highly the legal services rendered 
by Barrett to him during the Campbell v. State Farm litigation. (C&J's Brief at 44.) C&J 
further admits "During the State Farm case, 'Barrett performed numerous and important 
services for Slusher,' including fielding hundreds of phone calls from him." (R. 1767; 
9
 Barrett was age 60 in 1984 the Parties signed the original Contingency Agreement. 
Barrett was age 66 at the 1990 Modified Contingency Agreement. Barrett was age 70 in 
1994 when C&J assigned him the task, which he completed, to travel to California to 
meet with expert witness Steven Prater in preparation for the bad faith litigation. (R. 90.) 
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see also Brief of Appellees at 45.) 
The relationship of C&J and Barrett to Slusher may be the reason why C&J 
decided not to challenge any perceived breaches of the joint representation agreements at 
the time, as it would have necessarily involved the clients. C&J continued to work with 
Barrett, and Barrett continued his close attorney-client relationship with Slusher, keeping 
him in the group throughout the litigation. In fact, only after C&J no longer needed 
Slusher's on-going support did C&J vent displeasure with Barrett's work, including a 
laundry list of degrading complaints about Barrett's contributions, and filing suit to avoid 
paying what C&J characterized in 1990 as Barrett's "equitable" share. (R. 335.) 
C&J's calculated delay in bringing suit served two purposes for C&J. First, it 
caused Barrett to suffer great prejudice, because at this late date, it effectively denied 
Barrett the ability to cure any purported breach. Second, and more disturbingly, it 
allowed C&J to withhold work from Barrett, depriving him of recovery under the 1990 
contract and reducing his equitable recovery. C&J, as lead counsel, controlled all the 
circumstances of Barrett's participation in the case. C&J could have assigned more work 
to Barrett, but it did not. Now more than twenty years later, C&J attempts to use the very 
situation it created to the detriment of its co-counsel. This Court cannot countenance 
C&J's disingenuous maneuvering to undo the parties' 1990 Agreement 
Unfortunately and erroneously, the trial court went along for ride, and followed 
C&J's lead to award Barrett only for work performed, without regard to the fact that C&J 
never assigned work and, more importantly, without regard for the parties arrangement, 
as stated in the 1990 Agreement, for an "equitable split" of fees for their respective 
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involvements. Contingency fee contracts are not based upon hindsight but on foresight. 
The trial court ignored this aphorism in making its equitable award, creating a new 
Agreement that never was between these two parties, using standards for compensation 
that were never contemplated. Such an award must be overturned. 
II. BARRETT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE, 
C&J also claims that Barrett has failed to fulfill his marshaling burden by failing 
to introduce all evidence introduced at trial that supports the trial court's $25,000 award. 
This argument is without merit for at least two reasons. 
First, Barrett has met his marshaling burden by listing all of the evidence the trial 
court relied on in arriving at its equitable award. Because Barrett is not challenging the 
jury verdict from the trial, but rather the trial court's decision in the separate equitable 
proceeding, Barrett is not required to marshal evidence introduced at the trial. The facts 
from the equitable proceeding, as marshaled by Barrett, are sufficient. 
Second, Barrett is challenging two aspects of the trial court's equitable award: (a) 
that the trial court failed to ascribe a dollar figure to its findings or show that its $25,000 
award follows logically from the evidence; and (b) that the trial court used an incorrect 
equitable measure. For the first challenge (a), Barrett marshaled the evidence, as 
indicated above. For the second challenge (b), as explained in the initial brief, this is not 
a issue of fact but of law, meaning there is no marshaling burden. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decisions must be reversed. 
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DECLARATION OF VICTOR L. LUND 
Civil No. 030916399 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
I, VICTOR L. LUND, hereby declare under penalty of perjury as follows: 
1. I am presently a private investor and a member of several public corporation 
boards. 
2. I was previously employed by American Stores Company ("American Stores"), 
an SEC reporting public company headquartered in Utah, for approximately 22 years, which 
employment terminated on June 24, 1999. Froml990 to 1999 I served on the Board of Directors 
of American Stores. I was selected as Chief Executive Officer of American Stores in August, 
1992 and as Chairman of the Board in June, 1995. 
3. While I served as an officer and director of American Stores, its common stock 
was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The annual gross revenues of American 
Stores during the period I served as an officer and director would have been in the $20 Billion 
range. 
4. I presently serve as an independent member of the boards of directors of the 
following SEC reporting publicly traded companies: Del Monte, NCR, Borders and Service 
Corporation International ("SCI"). I also serve on the Audit Committees for NCR, SCI, as 
Committee Chair, and Borders, as Committee Chair. I also serve on the Corporate Governance 
Committees for Del Monte, SCI and Borders. 
5. I am familiar with the allegations and issues in the matter styled Christensen & 
Jensen, P.C., fka Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.; L. Rich Humpherys, individually, v. 
Barrett & Daines; W. Scott Barrett, fka Barrett & Brady; Robert Slusher, Civil No. 030916399 
in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah (the "Litigation). 
6. I have reviewed relevant pleadings and exhibits filed in the Litigation, including 
Defandant's/ Counterclaimant's Memorandum in Support of Their Notice of Objection and 
Cross-Motion re: Partial Distribution of Attorney's Fees and Sanctions; the Court's January 3, 
2006 Memorandum Decision where the Court said "an independent settlement with Mr. Slusher 
would have no cognizable advantage or gain for State Farm"; the Settlement Letter from 
Michael D. Zimmerman to L. Rich Humpherys dated November 14, 2001 which contained State 
Farm's settlement offer of $150,000,000; the letter from Mr. Humpherys to Mr. Zimmerman of 
November 16, 2001 rejecting the State Farm offer; and a summary of the 2001 State Farm 
financial information. 
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7. Based upon my review of the foregoing, I understand the relevant undisputed 
facts to be as follows: 
a. In the early 1980s there was an automobile accident in sardine canyon in Utah 
between Brigham City and Logan caused by Mr. Curtis Campbell. An individual 
named Todd Ospital died and an individual named Robert Slusher received major 
permanent injuries. In that trial a judgment was obtained by the Ospital Estate 
and Mr. Slusher against Mr. Campbell for an amount substantially in excess of 
their coverage limits with State Farm Automobile. Prior to the jury verdict State 
Farm had refused an offer within the coverage limits. Subsequently, the 
Campbells sued State Farm for breach of fiduciary duty etc. Prior to that suit the 
Campbell's entered into a sharing agreement with Ospital and Slusher. They 
would give Slusher and Ospital 1/3 each of any recovery from State Farm in 
return for the agreement by Ospital and Slusher to not pursue collection on the 
judgment against Campbell. 
b. In the subsequent litigation against State Farm, in 1995 and 1996, two bifurcated 
trials occurred, resulting in a jury verdict of $2,600,000 in compensatory damages 
and $145,000,000 in punitive damages. State Farm and the parties filed appeals 
and the trial court reduced the verdict to $27,000,000. In October 2001, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the original jury verdict for punitive 
damages to the sum of $145,000,000. With interest, the total punitive damage 
award as of that time was close to $200,000,000. 
c. State Farm then filed a Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 
to appeal the Utah Supreme Court decision. While that petition for certiorari was 
pending, State Farm, through counsel Michael D. Zimmerman, sent a written 
offer of settlement to counsel for the plaintiffs L. Rich Humphereys ("LRH") for 
the benefit and response of the plaintiff clients. The letter containing the offer 
was mailed to LRH on November 14, 2001 by State Farm's counsel. The letter 
informed LRH that State Farm would settle the matter for $150,000,000 on the 
condition that his clients join State Farm in filing a motion to vacate the Utah 
Supreme Court opinion and decision. 
d. LRH received the Settlement Offer Letter on November 16, 2001. He reviewed it 
with Mrs. Inez Campbell ("Campbell") and the representatives of the Todd 
Ospital estate ("Ospital"). Campbell and Ospital instructed LRH they would not 
accept the condition of the State Farm offer requiring the Utah Supreme Court 
decision be vacated. 
e. After discussing the matter with Campbell and Ospitals, LRH informed Slusher of 
the State Farm offer and of the terms and conditions and also informed Slusher 
that both Campbell and the Ospitals were rejecting the State Farm offer based 
3 
upon the condition that the Clients would have to join State Farm in filing a 
motion to vacate the decision and opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. LRH also 
informed Mr. Slusher that under the Client Fee Contract, the Clients had agreed 
that the acceptance of any settlement by State Farm would have to be unanimous 
and since both Mrs. Campbell and the Ospitals had rejected the State Farm offer, 
that it did not matter what Slusher's position was with respect to the State Farm 
offer. Accordingly, LRH informed Slusher that the State Farm offer could not 
and would not be accepted. Mr. Slusher did not agree with the decision by 
Campbell and Ospital to reject the settlement. He was interested in an economic 
recovery. 
f. On the same day, November 16, 2001, LRH hand delivered a letter to State 
Farm's attorney rejecting the proposed settlement. 
g. Ultimately, the petition for certiorari proceeded, the petition was granted and the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the $145,000,000 State Farm punitive damages 
award and directed the Utah Supreme Court to recalculate the punitive damages 
award. Thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court awarded revised punitive damages of 
less than $10,000,000 in the aggregate. 
h. Michael D. Zimmerman, counsel for State Farm testified in deposition that he 
never informed LRH that State Farm would not negotiate with one of the clients 
on an individual basis and that he never told LRH the November 14, 2001 offer 
was an all or nothing offer. Mr. Zimmerman has also testified that State Farm and 
its legal advisors had handicapped the probability of a grant of certiorari by the U. 
S. Supreme Court and ultimate success on their appeal at odds of 4 to 1 against. 
8. As a former CEO and Chairman of the Board of a major public company and a 
current member of the boards of four major public companies I can declare that I have 
substantial experience and expertise financial decisions made by the management and boards of 
public companies, including the analysis of the impact of major litigation on the financial 
strength and earnings of such companies and decisions regarding settlement of such matters. 
9. I have been asked to render my opinion as to whether, based upon my substantial 
experience and expertise with major corporations, State Farm would have been willing to 
negotiate a settlement separately with Mr. Slusher, even though they would not achieve their 
primary goal, a withdrawal of the Utah Supreme Court opinion. 
4 
10. I understand the importance of negating a major precedent which could impact 
future litigation by State Farm. 
11. Had Mr. S lusher been advised that he could negotiate separately with State Farm 
as to his 1/3 share of the total punitive award and been allowed to do so, it is my opinion that any 
major corporation, including State Farm, would have agreed to undertake such negotiations and 
would have been very interested in negotiating a settlement of an existing contingent liability of 
$65,000,000 plus (Mr. Slusher's share of the existing judgment, with interest, of approximately 
$200,000,000). Further, in my experience I think it likely that State Farm expected to negotiate 
the terms of their offer and may have been willing to "trade off certain aspects of their offer. 
LRH's rejection of the offer without probing possible alternatives is, to say the least, highly 
unusual. This is particularly true given, as Mr. Zimmerman testified, that State Farm and its 
counsel had handicapped the probability of a grant of certiorari by the U. S. Supreme Court and 
ultimate success on their appeal at odds of 4 to 1 against coupled with the size, $150,000,000, of 
State Farm's initial offer. In essence, LRH rejected an offer without understanding what the 
form of the final settlement might look like thus denying not only Mr. Slusher but all of his 
clients a chance for an acceptable settlement. 
Any responsible director or manager of a public company should, in the best interest of 
its stakeholders, be highly motivated to weigh the probabilities and negotiate a settlement. I 
cannot estimate what the final settlement number would have been, but I am of the opinion that 
State Farm management would have negotiated and likely have reached a settlement with Mr. 
Slusher. Such a settlement would have been in the best interests of both State Farm and Mr. 
Slusher. 
5 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah that the fbiegoingus true 
DATED: 
VJCTOR U LUND 
Ml* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the O day of April, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF VICTOR L. LUND to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Karra J. Porter 
Roger Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants 
David G. Williams 
Rodney R. Parker 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants 
Y-o^c^ Vo ^W^-
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Original Message 
From: opinions@email.utcourts.gov [mailto:opinions@email.utcourts.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2007 10:10 AM 
To: E. Barney Gesas 
Subject: Newly Posted Opinions - Utah Appellate Courts 
The following items of interest have been posted to the Utah State 
Court Website: 
Supreme Court Opinions: 
State v. Austin 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Austin0717Q7.pdf 
Benvenuto v. State 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Benvenuto0717 07.pdf 
Glew v. Ohio Savings 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opiniQns/supopin/Glew0717Q7.pdf 
Great American E&S Insurance Co. v. Knuteson 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/GreatAm0717 07.pdf 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Progressive20717 07.pdf 
State ex rel. Z.C. 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/ZC0717Q7.pdf 
If you would like to unsubscribe at any time click the following link: 
http://www.utcourts.gov/cgi-
bin/opinions/unsubscribe.cgi?ustring=unyosrWpr9pA1619 
From: Opinions [mailto:opinions@email.utcourts.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2007 12:46 PM 
To: Opinions 
Subject: Supreme Court Opinion Correction - No. 20060368-SC 
The Supreme Court has asked that notification be provided to all that the opinion 
which was emailed today in the matter of Great American E& S Insurance 
Company v. Brandon Knuteson, Supreme Court Case No. 20060368-SC was sent 
in error. This case was dismissed by the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 37 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT AMERICAN E&S INSURANCE vs. DALLAS W PETERS 
DE NUMBER 030909411 Miscellaneous 
*RENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
L A DEVER 
*TIES 
Plaintiff - GREAT AMERICAN E&S INSURANCE 
Represented by: JOHN R LUND 
Defendant - DALLAS W PETERS 
Represented by: STEPHEN G MORGAN 
Represented by: SAMMI V ANDERSON 
Defendant - BRANDON KNUTESON 
Represented by: ALAN C BRADSHAW 
Represented by: SAMMI V ANDERSON 
Defendant - MARY LYNN KNUTESON 
Represented by: ALAN C BRADSHAW 
Represented by: SAMMI V ANDERSON 
Third Pty Defendant - FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
COUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT -
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
966.00 
966.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
140.00 
140.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K + 
Amount Due: 105.00 
Amount Paid: 105.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COUNTER 10K-MORE 
tp://xchange.utcourts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 8/30/2007 
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Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
105.00 
105.00 
0.00 
0.00 
JL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVI 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
75.00 
75.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K + 
Amount Due: 105.00 
Amount Paid: 105.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL TYPE: COUNTER 10K-MORE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
FEE 
FEE 
DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
105.00 
105.00 
0.00 
0.00 
120.25 
120.25 
0.00 
0.00 
5.00 
5.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.75 
0.75 
0.00 
0.00 
205.00 
205.00 
0.00 
0.00 
hSE NOTE 
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3E NUMBER 030909411 Miscellaneous 
3CEEDINGS 
-25-03 Case filed 
-25-03 Judge L A DEVER assigned. 
-25-03 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
-25-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 140.00 
-25-03 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 140.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
-10-03 Filed: Plf Great American E&S Insurance Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
-10-03 Filed: Plf Great American E&S Insurance Company's memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
-11-03 Filed: Answer Answer, Counterclaims and Crossclaims 
BRANDON KNUTESON 
MARY LYNN KNUTESON 
-12-03 Filed: Answer Counterclaim, Jury Demand, and Third-party 
Complaint 
DALLAS W PETERS 
105.00 
105.00 
75.00 
-12-03 Filed: Counter 10K-MORE 
-12-03 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
-12-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 105.00 
-12-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 105.00 
-12-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 75.00 
-12-03 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K + Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K +; Code 
Description: COUNTER 10K-MORE; Code Description: JURY 
DEMAND - CIVIL; Mail Payment; 
i-12-03 COUNTER 10K-MORE Payment Received: 
.-12-03 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 
i-16-03 Filed return: Summons on return 
Party Served: KNUTESON, BRANDON 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 08, 2003 
>-17-03 Filed: Amended answer, counterclaims and third party complaint 
5-17-03 Filed: Counter 10K-MORE 
5-17-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 105.00 
5-17-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 105.00 
5-17-03 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K + Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: 3RD PRTY CMPLT 10K +; 
Description: COUNTER 10K-MORE 
5-17-03 COUNTER 10K-MORE Payment Received: 
5-19-03 Filed: certificate of service of first set of requests for 
production of documents, requests for admission, and 
interrogatories to Plaintiff Great American E&S Insurance 
Company 
5-20-03 Filed return: Summons on return 
105.00 
Code 
105.00 
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>E NUMBER 030909411 Miscellaneous 
Party Served: FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 17, 2003 
-01-03 Filed: Plf Great AMerican E&S Insurance Compnay's answer to 
counterclaim of Dallas W. Peters 
-07-03 Filed: Federal Insurance Company's Motion for an extension of 
time to file a response to third party plf's complaint 
-07-03 Filed: Notice of appearance of counsel for third party deft 
Federal Insurance Company 
-09-03 Filed: Plaintiff Great American E&S Insurance Company's answer 
to amended counterclaim of Brandon Knuteson individually and on 
behalf of Mary Lynn Knuteson 
GREAT AMERICAN E&S INSURANCE 
-11-03 Filed order: Order Granting Federal Insuranc Company's Motion 
for an Extension of Time to File a Response to Third Party 
Plaintiff's Complaint 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed July 10, 2003 
-14-03 Filed: Answer of Third Party Defendant to Knuteson's Third 
Party Complaint 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
-14-03 Filed: Certificate of service of first set of requests for 
production of documents, requests for admission, and 
interrogatories to third party plf Federal Insurance Company 
-14-03 Filed: Affidavit of Joseph E. Minnock 
-14-03 Filed: Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
-14-03 Filed: Affidavit of Robert C. Gilchrist 
-14-03 Filed: Rule 56(f) affidavit of Alan C. Bradshaw 
-14-03 Filed: Deft, Counterclaim Plf and third party Plf's memorandum 
in support of Rule 56(f) Motion 
-21-03 Filed return: Summons on return 
Party Served: FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: July 14, 2003 
'-23-03 Filed: Certificate of Service of Discovery Responses 
'-28-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 120.25 
'-28-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.00 
r
-28-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 120.25 
Note: COPY FEE 
'-28-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 5.00 
2-05-03 Filed: Great American E&S Insurance Company's response to deft, 
Counterclaim Plf and third party Plf's Rule 56(f) Motion 
2-05-03 Filed: Pro Hac Vice Motion and consent of local counsel 
2-05-03 Filed: Receipt pf Pro Hac Vice filing fee and supporting 
documentation 
3-06-03 Filed order: Order permitting admission Pro Hac Vice 
Judge L A DEVER 
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Signed August 06, 2003 
-25-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
-25-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
-28-03 Filed: Motion for Protective Order 
-28-03 Filed: Memorandum in support of Plf's Motion for Protective 
Order 
-28-03 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision and request for hearing 
-11-03 Filed: Request for Attorney's Scheduling Conference 
-12-03 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to Plffs Motion for Protective 
Order 
-12-03 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: rhondam 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice to 
Submit for Decision on Defendant's Rule 56 (f) Motion filed on 
August 28, 2003, Defendant's Rule 56 (f) Motion for Additional 
Discovery is granted. Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order 
is granted. Court determines oral argument on these two issues is 
not necessary, request is therefore denied. 
Judge L A DEVER 
'-16-03 Filed order: Order (re Motion for Protective Order) 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed September 15, 2003 
•-19-03 Filed: Appendix to Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon 
Knuteson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
)-19-03 Filed: Motion Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon 
Knuteson's Motionf or Partial Summary Judgment 
)-19-03 Filed: Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon Knuteson's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
)-19-03 Filed: Defendant Brandon Knuteston's Memorandum in Opposiiton 
to Plaintiff Great American E&S Insurance Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
2-19-03 Filed: Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon Knuteston's 
Ex Parte Application to File Overlength Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
2-23-03 Filed order: Order Granting Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff Brnadon Knuteson's Ex Parte Application to File 
Overlength Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed September 23, 2003 
9-30-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030909411 ID 5738088 
SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled. 
rinted: 08/30/07 10:58:22 Page 5 
ASE NUMBER 030909411 Miscellaneous 
ttp://xchange.utcourts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 8/30/2007 
Date: 10/23/2003 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: L A DEVER 
-30-03 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on October 23, 2003 at 10:00 AM in 
Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
-07-03 Filed: Reply memorandum in support of Plf's Motion for 
Protective Order 
-14-03 Filed: letter from Jill Dunyon regarding outstanding motions 
-16-03 Filed: certificate of service 
-21-03 Filed: Errata to Appendix to Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff Brandon Knuteston's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
-22-03 Filed: Stipulation and Motion to Continue Scheduling Conference 
-22-03 Note: **Per phone call from atty Jean Layton, all parties 
stipulate to strike the Scheduling Conference date. A written 
stipulation will be filed with the court** 
-22-03 SCHEDULING CONF Cancelled. 
Reason: Stipulation of counsel 
-27-03 Filed: Certificate of Service 
-30-03 Filed: Dallas Peters' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
-30-03 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File an Overlength 
Memorandum 
-30-03 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Great American's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and In Support of Dallas Peters' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
-03-03 Filed: Ex-parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Memorandum 
-03-03 Filed: Plaintiff Great American E & S Insurance Company's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposiiton to Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon 
Knuteson's and Defendant Dallas W. Peters' Motions for Parti 
.-03-03 Filed: Affidavit of John Morrison 
.-03-03 Filed: Affidavit of Steve Handley 
.-03-03 Filed: Second Affidavit of Mark Marshall 
.-04-03 Filed order: Order granting leave to file overlength memorandum 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed November 04, 2003 
.-19-03 Note: **Jean Layton, Secretary to John Lund will send out 
notice regarding scheduling conf. sched. for 12/30/02 at 9:00** 
L-19-03 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on December 30, 2003 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
L-21-03 Filed: Amended Notice of Scheduling Conference 
1-15-03 Filed: Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon Knuteson's 
Ex Parte Application to File Overlength Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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-15-03 Filed: Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon Knuteson's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
-15-03 Filed: Rule 56(F) Affidavit of Alan C. Bradshaw 
-15-03 Filed: Affidavit of Steve Handley 
-19-03 Filed order: Order Granting Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff Brandon Knutestonfs Ex Parte Application to file 
Overlength Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed December 19, 2003 
-29-03 Filed: Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs1 Motion to Compel 
-29-03 Filed: Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon Knuteson's 
Ex Parte Application to File Overlength Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Compel 
-29-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 
-30-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030909411 ID 5818481 
ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled. 
Date: 02/20/2004 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
before Judge L A DEVER 
Motions to be heard are Motion for Protective Order and Motion to 
Compel. 
-30-03 ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled on February 20, 2004 at 10:00 AM in 
Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
-30-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: rhondam 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN R LUND 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ALAN C BRADSHAW 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:13-9:35 
HEARING 
This case is before the Court for a Scheduling Conference. This 
case is not ready for a trial setting because there are pending 
motions. Oral Arguments are scheduled for February 20th, 2004 at 
10:00 a.m. 
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Motions to be heard on that date are Motion for Protective Order 
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and Motion to Compel. 
Bart Hall was present by phone. 
ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled. 
Date: 02/20/2004 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
before Judge L A DEVER 
-07-04 Filed order: Order Granting Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff Brandon Knuteston's Ex Parte Application to File 
Overlength memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed January 07, 2004 
-29-04 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff's motion to compel 
-03-04 Filed order: Stipulation and Order of Dismissal of Certain 
Claims with Prejudice 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed February 03, 2003 
-06-04 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Cancelled. 
-20-04 Filed: Notice of Depositions 
-20-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: rhondam 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN R LUND 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ALAN C BRADSHAW 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 10:01-10:09 
HEARING 
This case is before the Court for Oral Arguments. Counsel informs 
the Court that the Motion to Compel has been resolved. Status and 
scheduling remains the issue. The remaining status is that 
cross-motions and affidavits of witnesses have been submitted 
Witnesses still need depositions. Court Orders depositions to be 
completed by March 30, 2004. All supplemental briefing completed 
by May 10, 2004. Hearing on Motions scheduled in this matter. If 
conflict with date, may reschedule with clerk. 
MOTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 05/19/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
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Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
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450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: L A DEVER 
-20-04 MOTION HEARING scheduled on May 19, 2004 at 09:00 AM in Third 
Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
-10-04 Filed: Supplemental brief of the Knutesons and Peters in 
support of Motion for partial Summary Judgment 
-10-04 Filed: Motion to strike Rule 56(f) affidavit of Alan C. 
Bradshaw 
-10-04 Filed: Memorandum in support of Motion to strike Rule 56(f) 
affidavit of Alan C. Bradshaw 
-10-04 Filed: Plf Great American E&S Insurance Company's supplemental 
memorandum in support of its Motion for Sumamry Judgment and in 
opposition to deft and counterclaim plf Brandon Knuteson's and 
deft Dallas Peters' Motions for partial Summary Judgment 
-11-04 Filed: Plaintiff Great American E&S Insurance Company's 
corrected supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment and in opposition to Defendant and 
counterclaim Plaintiff Brandon Knuteson's and Defendant Dallas 
W. Peters' 
-11-04 Filed: motions for partial summary judgment 
-11-04 Filed: Ex parte motion for leave to file overlength memorandum 
-12-04 Filed: Motion stipulated motion for dismissal with prejudice of 
Third-Party Defendant Federal Insurance Company 
-17-04 Filed order: Order Granting Stipulated Motion for Dismissal 
With Prejudice of Third-Party Defendant Federal Insurance 
Company 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed May 17, 2004 
>-17-04 Filed order: Order Granting Leave to File Overlength Memorandum 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed May 17, 2004 
>-19-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: rhondam 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN R LUND 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SAMMI V ANDERSON 
ALAN C BRADSHAW 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:02-10:55 
HEARING 
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This case is before the Court for a Motion Hearing regarding 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's counsel Bart 
Hall argues plaintiff's motion. Defendant's Counsel Alan C. 
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Bradshaw responds to plaintiff's arguments. 
Court takes matter under advisement and will render a written 
decision. 
Bart Hall present as attorney for the plaintiff. 
-13-04 Filed order: Memorandum Decision (Great American Ins. Mot. S/J 
Granted-Def. Mot. S/J denied) 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed July 12, 2004 
-27-06 Filed order: Order (re hrg. 5/19/04) 
Judge L A DEVER 
Signed March 26, 2006 
-27-06 Case Disposition is Dismsd w prejudice 
Disposition Judge is L A DEVER 
-19-06 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
-19-06 Filed: Waiver of Bond 
-19-06 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
-19-06 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
-19-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
-19-06 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
-20-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to Utah Supreme 
Court 
-25-06 Filed: Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment hearing dated 
5-19-04, Peggy Grover, CCT 
-25-06 Filed: Notice of Filing Transcript of Motion for Summary 
Judgment hearing dated 5-19-04, Peggy Grover, CCT 
:-26-06 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter to Counsel - the notice of 
appeal in this case has been filed with the Utah Supreme Court 
- 20060368-SC 
[-26-06 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Order - effective twenty days 
from the date of this order, this matter will be transferred to 
the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition - 20060368-SC 
>-25-06 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Order - This Court has elected 
to retain the appeal for review on its docket - the prior order 
of transfer to the Court of Appeals is vacated - 20060368-SC 
3-31-06 Note: Forwarded Cert/Copy of Index to Court of Appeals -
20060368-ca 
3-02-07 Note: Record Frowarded to the Utah Supreme Court - Files-6 -
Tran-1 (inside Vol III) - 20060368-SC 
7-18-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Order of Dismissal - based upon 
the stipulation of the parties - it is hereby ordered that this 
appeal is dismissed, each party to bear their own costs and 
fees - 20060368-SC 
7-19-07 Filed: Utah Supreme Court-Notice of Decision-Appeal 
Dismissed-Each party to bear their own costs-20060368-SC 
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